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Power Dynamics and Environmental Resource Flows in the Network Society: 
Water Bottling and Policy Development in the Columbia Gorge 
By Cody Shotola-Schiewe 
 
 
Abstract:  This research explores the sociopolitical development of resource rights policy and 
environmental resource flows in the network society.  The specific interaction studied is centered 
on a disputed proposal by Nestlé Waters North America to the City of Cascade Locks, on the 
Oregon side of the Columbia River, which would allow Nestlé to build a water bottling plant 
accessing the culturally and environmentally significant Oxbow Springs.  The primary question 
guiding this research is: In the case of the developing policy concerning water rights in the 
County of Hood River, what are the identifiable power dynamics between civil society actors, 
private interests, and state institutions within the networks involved in the making of local 
environmental policy and the resultant resource flows?  The interactional information was 
collected from a variety of publicly accessible sources including documents published by 
government agencies and media coverage from established news organizations, and then coded 
to an operationalized Network Theory of Power.  Further informed by scholarship from both 
political and environmental sociology and globalization literature, I use a form of content 
analysis to argue that in interactions where the state and private networks were functioning under 
a cooperative set of goals, a private economic basis of power motivated the state network.  
Conversely, when state network goals or state network structures and protocols (organizational 
hierarchy, legislation, etc.) were aligned or accessible to civil society networks and activists, a 
public political basis of power motivated the state network.  This research elucidates important 
implications for policy making in the era of internet-fueled globalization, public and privately 
managed environmental resource flows, and effective strategies of citizen-based resistance.    
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Introduction 
 This inquiry is inspired by local community concern, both in Hood River County and the 
broader Northwest region, about environmental policy making and the use of public and 
privately held natural resources (especially by global corporations).  It also reflects the growth of 
my personal fascination with the crossroads of political, economic and environmental sociology 
throughout my undergraduate career and life experience in the early twenty-first century.  This 
developing political, economic and cultural interaction can be taken as a microcosm of the 
broader problematic atmosphere for effective environmental governance in which local resources 
and public goods are increasingly used, and exploited unsustainably, by private interests with 
short term concerns.  In this case, the disputed proposal would allow a Nestlé bottling plant to 
access and extract water from Oxbow Springs in the Columbia Gorge, a site that is both 
environmentally and culturally significant. 
Certainly, the potential subordination of local, state and even national regulatory power to 
corporate interests, especially in policy disputes concerning natural resources and indigenous 
sacred sites, is not a phenomenon new to the twenty-first century.  However, Manuel Castells 
(2000) and other social scientists argue that the development of social movements, political 
policies, state governance and resource flows (among other phenomena) has been revolutionized 
by communication and information technology, functioning in interactional networks, and we 
should look to understand the power dynamics emergent out of this altered context.  We are 
encouraged to investigate how institutional and cultural networks at the local, regional, national 
and supra-national levels interact in an increasingly globalized society, in the interest of utilizing 
and designing effective policy and regulatory structures which will protect long term public 
interests and regulate environmental resource flows.   
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This isn’t to presuppose we should idealize our conception of effective democratic 
regulation and public goods stewardship (assuming these are our aims) towards localities or 
minority positions within complex policy disputes which involve valid concerns at multiple 
levels of governmental and societal structure.  Rather, it is to take up a task central to the 
discipline of sociology, as Castells (2016) sees it, “…to understand power relationships, the 
defining relationships of human existence, in ways that are specific to our world, and to do so by 
constructing an open-ended, grounded theory that could unveil and transform the sources of 
domination and, eventually, liberation.”  Furthermore, environmental sociologists have recently 
adopted and extrapolated Castells’ conception of the space of flows as a key to understanding the 
network society and transboundary resource flows.  This has led to the opportunity for the 
broadening of this conception into the sociology of flows, which holds promise as a burgeoning 
paradigm within environmental sociology (Mol and Spaargaren, 2006). 
 My interest in studying this particular interaction, centered on the disputed Nestlé Waters 
North America proposal to build a bottling plant on a local water resource for its broader 
international commercialization is admittedly tripartite.  First, through a lens of environmental 
sociology, to consider the public management of freshwater, which will inevitably supplant oil as 
the most important and coveted liquid resource on this planet.  Second, through a lens of political 
sociology, to understand the power dynamics underlying the development of resource rights 
policy and resource use, as dependent on social processes which are increasingly entangled in the 
technologically-enabled globalization of neoliberal capitalism and its encroachment into the 
political sphere at all levels of governance structures.  Third, in the vein of social movement 
studies, in the hope of developing mechanisms, methods, and a realistic understanding of social 
processes and present political-economy for the sake of building effective citizen resistance to 
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international corporations where inherently private short term motivations for profitability run 
against long term interests of local civil societies and democratic governance structures.       
From this basis, my research explores the question: In the case of the developing policy 
concerning water rights in the County of Hood River, what are the identifiable power dynamics 
between civil society actors, private interests, and state institutions within the networks involved 
in the making of local environmental policy and the resultant resource flows?  Considering the 
historical development of this interaction using content analysis, I will argue that in interactions 
where the state and private networks were functioning under a cooperative set of goals, a private 
economic basis of power motivated the state network.  Conversely, when state network goals or 
state network structures and protocols (organizational hierarchy, legislation, etc.) were aligned or 
accessible to civil society networks and activists, the public political basis of power motivated 
the state network.
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Literature Review 
Power Dynamics in Globalizing Society: 
The founding of the discipline of sociology originated largely with the questioning of the 
implicit power dynamics of the social world, and of the nature of the forces which construct, 
shape and change society more generally.  Indeed, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Michel Foucault 
made the concept of power central to their work, much of which could be posthumously 
classified as political sociology (Nash, 2010:3).  An overwhelming amount of the sociological 
discourse concerning power in the 19th and 20th centuries was inspired by industrializing urban 
society and the political, cultural and economic conflicts that arose therein.  While urban 
sociology emphasized culture, political sociology was focused on the interplay between society 
and the institution of the state, with its, “monopoly of legitimate use of physical force” (Weber, 
1946:78).  Though the state has not become at all irrelevant in contemporary political sociology, 
Kate Nash argues that, “economic, political and cultural globalization means that what the state 
is and does is now itself in question” (2010:3).  Neither the Marxist paradigm of economic 
reductionism, nor the Weberian counter-position of the autonomy of the political sphere (over 
the economic sphere) as a function of the sovereign nation-state, satisfies the question of power 
in this globalizing context.  
In “Class, Status, Party,” Weber acknowledged the existence of economically-based 
power, especially in the context of liberal society, but he departs decidedly from Marx saying 
that, “‘economically conditioned’ power is not, of course, identical with ‘power’ as such.  On the 
contrary, the emergence of economic power may be the consequence of power existing on other 
grounds” (1946:180).  Accordingly, he offers a definition of power which allows for its cultural 
and political complexity: “In general, we understand by ‘power’ the chance of a man or of a 
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number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of 
others who are participating in the action” (Weber, 1946:180).       
Manuel Castells, in his recently published piece “A Sociology of Power” (2016), 
continues this sociological tradition of holding power dynamics as integral to society, insofar as 
they construct, form and reform the institutions and norms that regulate social activity.  Castells 
defines power as “the relational capacity that enables certain social actors to asymmetrically 
influence the decisions of other actors in ways that favor the empowered actors’ will, interests, 
and values” (2016:2).  Castells’ definition of power visibly relies heavily on Weber’s, expanding 
slightly to imply the often-unequal power differential of actors engaged in political, cultural and 
economic conflicts.  This is a lens that is characteristic of Castell’s work, which has often been 
concerned with potentially and actively subordinated populations in relation to the processes and 
structures of society.  Further building on Weber’s foundational ideas on the nature of power, 
Castells goes on to include the relationship between knowledge and power observing that often, 
“power is exercised by means of coercion (the monopoly of violence, legitimate or not, by the 
state) and/or by the construction of meaning in people’s minds through mechanisms of cultural 
production and distribution” (Castells, 2016:2).  The actors who exercise power, argues Castells, 
do so through the establishment of institutions, laws and policies, as well as communication 
systems that express their interests and values and shape social conduct.  However, this isn’t to 
suggest that power (and counterpower) operates in a process of unilateral causation or 
subordination, often reduced in early Marxist work to a direct function of class antagonism. 
While Castells was certainly inspired by the question of power as it relates to economic position, 
as well as the resurgent relevance of Marxian political-economy to internet-enabled globalization 
and patterns of inequality, he acknowledges that “Power exercisers are diverse, they operate 
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through alliances to find convergence points in their interests and values,” working on pre-
existing institutions, or outside of them (2016:2).  In a postmodern fashion, and inspired by his 
research in the era of internet-fueled globalization (further explored below), Manuel Castells 
doesn’t hold specific institutions (the state) or economic actors (capital) as permanently 
hegemonic sites of power.  Instead, he is interested in the dynamism of power in society: 
“...institutionalized power, together with its rules, is always facing resistance by those actors 
whose interests and values are not sufficiently represented in the dominant institutions,” allowing 
for a sociology of power that doesn’t ignore counterpower relationships and social movements 
(2016:2). 
Castells is explicit that in his research and work he sought to engage in “…grounded 
theory rather than grand theory,” and that while all empirical research relies on theoretical tools 
and assumptions, his theoretical work had to be built on an empirical foundation (2016:3).  With 
this empirical scientific standard, I will pursue my research, taking as Castells does that, “at any 
given point in time in any given society, institutions and norms are the expression of the state of 
power relationships, in terms of both institutionalized norms and of the struggles and 
negotiations that challenge the persistence of these norms” (2016:2). 
  
Globalization and the Network Society: 
Beginning in the late 1970s there have been significant changes in the geography, 
composition and institutional framework of the world economy (Sassen, 2011).  Of key 
importance to the study of the global economy has been the increased transnational mobility of 
capital, allowed in part by the telecommunications revolution (Sassen, 2011).  Until the 1990s, 
globalization (especially economic liberalization policy) was welcomed, both popularly and in 
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some scholarship, as it was proffered as expanding liberal society and secular activity, increasing 
capital flows to developing countries, generally spreading knowledge and increasing social 
mobility as well as allowing access to broader markets (Stiglitz, 2007).  After acting as Chief 
Economist of the World Bank in the late 1990s, Joseph Stiglitz identified several problems with 
neoliberal globalization in his book Making Globalization Work (2007), of which the challenges 
of “protecting the environment” and “a flawed system of global governance” are extremely 
relevant to my research.  “In effect, economic globalization has outpaced political globalization,” 
Stiglitz argues, “…we have a chaotic, uncoordinated system of global governance without global 
government, an array of institutions and agreements dealing with a series of problems, from 
global warming to international trade and capital flows” (2007:21). 
Manuel Castells, in The Rise of the Network Society (2000), posits that only in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century has this radically new economy and society emerged.  He argues 
that it is fundamentally distinct from previous economic paradigms due to three key 
factors.  First, Castells describes this new paradigm as informational insofar as economic 
productivity and competitiveness in this system depends on the capacity to generate, process and 
apply knowledge-based information flexibly and efficiently.  Second, Castells argues that it is 
global because activities of production, consumption, and circulation, (and their components of 
capital, labor, raw materials, management, information, and markets) are organized on a global 
scale.  Third, this new economic paradigm is networked due to the new historical conditions of 
productivity and competition being generated in a global network of interaction between 
business and political institutions (Castells, 2000).  Castells writes, “new information 
technologies, by transforming the process of information processing, act upon all domains of 
human activity and make it possible to establish endless connections between different domains, 
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as well as between elements and agents of such activities” (2000:78).  In this conception, the new 
economy and network society are emergent and dependent on the information technology 
revolution, with the internet giving the material basis for the new nature of the economy and both 
micro and macro social and economic interaction.  Castells proposes that this global economy is 
distinct from previous generations of the world economy (for instance as described by Fernand 
Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein).  He defines the global economy as “an economy whose core 
components have the institutional, organizational and technological capacity to work as a unit in 
real time, or in chosen time, on a planetary scale” (Castells, 2000:102).   
 
Towards a Sociology of Flows and Implications for Environmental-Political Sociology:  
Using data that show the immense growth of foreign direct investment, cross-border bond 
and equity transactions, and foreign assets and liabilities as a percentage of domestic assets, 
Castells argues that “…while capitalism is characterized by its relentless expansion, always 
trying to overcome limits of time and space, it was only in the late twentieth century that the 
world economy was able to become truly global on the basis of the new infrastructure provided 
by information and communication technologies” (2000:101).  Built upon this conception of a 
new global network society, Castells observes a new spatial logic which he calls the “space of 
flows,” which he argues is becoming “the dominant spatial manifestation of power and function 
in our societies” (2000:409).  While Castells and Sassen see certain metropolitan centers like 
Tokyo, New York, and London as key nodes for this networked financial-informational activity, 
the spatial logic of the network society is not one of stability or centralized hierarchy, but rather 
flexibility and adaptability.  “Accordingly, regions, under the impulse of their governments and 
business elites, have restructured themselves to compete in the global economy, and they have 
established networks of cooperation between regional institutions and between region-based 
11 
 
companies.  Thus, regions and localities do not disappear, but become integrated in international 
networks that link up their most dynamic sectors” (Castells, 2000:412).  Castells posits a 
conceptual antagonism here, between the space of flows, which he defines as, “the material 
organization of time-sharing social practices that work through flows,” and the locally-bound 
space of places in the network, so that "the space of power and wealth is projected throughout 
the world, while people’s life and experience is rooted in places, in their culture, in their history” 
(2000:442-446).  In this conception of the dynamic global network, no place exists by itself, but 
its position is based in its role in (or exclusion from) the flows of the network society.  Castells 
builds his conception of the space of flows in three layers.  The first layer is the material support 
of information and communication technologies of the network society previously discussed, 
while the second layer is made up of nodes and hubs: “some places are exchangers, 
communication hubs playing a role of coordination for the smooth interaction of all the elements 
integrated in the network.  Other places are the nodes of the network; that is, the location of 
strategically important functions that build a series of locally-based activities and organizations 
around a key function in the network” (Castells, 2000:443).  The third and perhaps most 
important layer of the space of flows for the purposes of my research is the “spatial organization 
of the dominant, managerial elites (rather than classes) that exercise the directional functions 
around which such space is articulated” (Castells, 2000:445).  Castells admits that the theory of 
the space of flows begins with an implicit assumption that societies are organized often 
asymmetrically around the dominant interests in the given social structure.  While the space of 
flows is not the only spatial logic of our society, often more social than structural, Castells argues 
that it can be said to be the dominant spatial logic, “because it is the spatial logic of the dominant 
interests/functions in our society” (2000:445).  Furthermore, the more social organization is 
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based upon ahistorical flows, dominating specific places, “the more the logic of global power 
escapes the socio-political control of historically specific local/national societies” (Castells 
2000:446). 
Especially from the 1990’s onward, general and environmental sociology became 
interested in understanding the relationship between the global and local, in the context of global 
environmental governance.  Environmental sociologists Mol and Spaargaren have argued that 
general and environmental sociology have in some respects converged with the emergence of the 
widely accepted theoretical perspective of approaching social systems and complex systems 
using conceptual models of networks and flows (2006:41-42).  John Urry, in Global Complexity, 
(2003) sees the human agent as intertwined and intricately connected with material and 
technological systems in a range of diverse networks and flows, pointing to the convergence of 
social and material-environmental study so that “there are no purified social networks, only 
‘material worlds’ (or hybrids that involve peculiar and complex socialites with objects)” (Urry, 
2003: 56).  Where environmental science has analyzed environmental flows primarily in material 
and biological terms, unsurprisingly it pays little attention to social systems and social networks, 
“such as the social interactions, dynamics, and power relations governing these material flows, or 
the nonmaterial (money, information, etc.) flows that parallel these material and energy flows” 
(Mol and Spaargaren, 2006:54).  Between these two investigative perspectives —that is, general 
sociology’s focus on the social agent and the social world amid power dynamics, and 
environmental science’s focus on biological and material flows— lies the important gap in 
theory and research where environmental-political sociology and the sociology of flows has 
enormous potential.  It is here that I place my research.    
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Water Rights and Private Accumulation Strategies amid Public Opposition: 
Sociologists Daniel Jaffee and Soren Newman (2013) have illuminated the 
commodification of water as not only an issue relating to that particular resource, but as part of a 
broader trend of the market’s steady incursion into the public sphere, and its implications for 
democracy and public services.  When people opt for private services, (bottled water for 
instance, which is often just rebottled municipal tap water) the result is often decreasing 
willingness to fund public goods like tap water infrastructure. As the quality of public services 
worsens as a result of underfunding, John Vail argues that this “[weakens] the very rationale for 
these goods and [creates] a vicious spiral of decline that grievously corrodes the public’s trust of 
governmental services and damages the very possibility of cultivating a shared sense of 
community upon which a democratic citizenship is founded” (Vail, 2010:326).   
In his book The New Imperialism (2003), geographer David Harvey locates the impetus 
of the increasing marketization of public domain within the recent overaccumulation crisis of 
capital in which “surpluses of capital…lie idle with no profitable outlets in sight” (2003:149).  
Where industrial liberalism’s method of wealth accumulation derived much of its profit margin 
from the difference between the relatively cheap acquisition and activation of resources with 
labor (aided by the opening of new markets), and the market value of the goods produced (Marx 
1867), Harvey argues that capital in the age of neoliberalism must increasingly turn to 
traditionally non-market goods and services in its necessary search for new ground where it may 
retain or return to profitability.  Indeed, he argues that “The corporatization and privatization of 
hitherto public assets (such as universities), to say nothing of the wave of privatization (of water 
and public utilities of all kinds) that has swept the world, indicate a new wave of ‘enclosing the 
commons.’  As in the past, the power of the state is frequently used to force such processes 
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through even against popular will” (Harvey, 2003:148).  In light of the activity of global capital 
amid the overaccumulation crisis that arose in the 1970’s, which is beyond the scope of our 
investigation, Harvey coins the term “accumulation by dispossession” to describe this neoliberal 
phenomenon of aggressive commodification where international financialized capital turns to 
even the public sector to “release a set of assets...at very low (and in some instances zero) cost.  
Overaccumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them to profitable 
use” (149).   
Based on this, Jaffee and Newman have established that the privatization of drinking 
water represents an important microcosm of the broader ongoing phenomenon of the 
commodification of the commons within neoliberal strategies of global capital firms, to 
accumulate by dispossession and capture domains where they may find continued profitable 
arrangements for capital accumulation.  While municipal tap water networks have provided 
significant barriers to capital accumulation in the realm of water commodification, Jaffee and 
Newman argue that “bottled water does not present many of the barriers to capital accumulation 
posed by tap water networks, in contrast with Bakker’s (2005) influential framing of water as an 
‘uncooperative commodity’” (Jaffee and Newman 2013:3).  While I am omitting important 
discussion of the environmental impacts and energy costs of bottled water as compared to 
municipal tap water systems, according to Barlow, almost 25 percent of all bottled water crosses 
national borders (2007:84).  This places water commodification glaringly within the problematic 
of financial globalization and the management of local public resources.  While there has been 
resistance in many localities to its water acquisition strategies, “in many of these cases, Nestlé 
has acquired legal rights or title to the water or land and actively courted local officials, often 
prior to making its plans public” (Jaffee and Newman 2013:12).  Where activists and public 
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relations campaigns have pushed back against public water commodification, Jaffee and 
Newman’s work demonstrates cases in which “Nestlé has changed its commercial strategies, 
increasingly moving away from outright acquisition of land and water rights toward extracting 
spring water as the customer of local public water utilities, but with long term contractual access 
rights” (2013:12) 
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Theoretical Framework of Analysis 
A Network Theory of Power: 
 With Castells’ diverse background of ethnographic work across the world, in “A 
Sociology of Power” (2016), he takes up the purpose of building an analytical framework that 
can be used in research, adapted and operationalized, “in ways that allow the gradual 
construction of a theory of power and counterpower in the network society” (2016:15).  Instead 
of dissolving power relationships in an endless deployment of structural networks, or dead-
ending analytical efforts with a grand theory that locates power as a single entity in the network 
society, Castells offers his framework to guide research on power under the hypothesis that 
“exercisers of power in the network society are networks of actors, exercising power in their 
respective networks, the networks they program to further their interests and values” (2016:15).  
This is a decidedly dynamic and general framework, operating under the assumption that “how 
different actors program the network is a process specific to each network,” so that “power 
relationships at the network level have to be identified and understood in terms specific to each 
network” (2016:15).  Furthermore, while the agency of power may be embodied by social actors, 
power operates not through isolated individuals, but is constituted by the functions and 
interactions of the networks themselves.  From this, Castells outlines four distinct forms of 
power which are useful categories for analyzing specific interactions and power dynamics in 
light of internet-dependent globalization.  After outlining these categories I will use this 
operational framework to analyze the historical information I have collected. 
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1) Networking Power:  
Networking power refers to “the power of the actors and organizations included in the 
networks that constitute the core of the global network society over those human collectives or 
individuals not included in these global networks” (Castells, 2016:11). This power dynamic 
operates though inclusion/exclusion, in that once a network is constituted, core nodes may 
exercise gatekeeping strategies to bar access to those who may not add value to the network, or 
“who jeopardize the interests that are dominant in the network’s programs” (2016:11). 
 
2) Network Power:  
Recognizing that globalization involves social coordination among multiple networked 
actors, network power is due to certain communication standards, or what Castells calls 
“protocols of communication,” which determine “the rules to be accepted once in the network” 
(Castells, 2016:11). Network power is “the power of these protocols over the network’s 
components,” which “ultimately favors the interests of a specific set of social actors at the source 
of network formation” (2016:11). 
 
3) Networked Power 
With a network conceptualized by a cooperating set of nodes (organizations and actors) 
informed by a set of protocols (communication etiquette, laws, organizational structures), 
networked power reflects the understanding that once formed, each network defines and 
manages its own power relationships depending on its programmed goals.  Here, Castells 
encourages us to acknowledge the dynamic and non-monopolistic interactions in even some of 
the most entrenched networks (the most established, or networked power), whether it may be the 
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financial elite, who have some power but are “highly dependent on both the dynamics of global 
markets and the decisions of governments in terms of regulations and policies,” or governments 
themselves, which are connected in imperfect networks of global governance and “conditioned 
by the pressures of interest groups, obliged to negotiate with the media that translate government 
actions for their citizenries, and confronted by social movements and expression of resistance 
from civil societies” (2016:11).  Indeed, departing from traditionally formulated conceptions of 
power as static and unilaterally dominating, we must recognize that even the most powerful 
states and actors have some power, but do not wield power autonomously or exclusively. 
 
4) Network-Making Power: 
Castells contends that network-making power is the most crucial form of power in the 
network society, as the capacity to program and reprogram the goals of the network is decisive, 
“because once programmed, the network has the capability to perform efficiently and 
reconfigure itself to achieve its goals” (2016:12).  In a society based in networks, the ability for 
social actors to exercise control over others depends on two mechanisms: “(a) the ability to 
constitute networks, and (b) the ability to connect and ensure the cooperation of different 
networks by sharing common goals and combining resources while fending off competition from 
other networks by setting up strategic cooperation” (2016:12).  Castells calls holders of the first 
power position programmers, and of the second, switchers.  While these two categories are 
certainly concepts based in social actors, they are not necessarily identified by one particular 
group or individual, and more often than not, “networks operate at the interface between various 
social actors, defined in terms of their positions in the social structure and in the organizational 
framework of society” (2016:12).   
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Research Methods and Historical Content Analysis 
The primary goal of my research is to meaningfully describe the power dynamics 
between civil society actors (including those involved in social movement activities), private 
interests, political structures, and the relevant socially-based networks involved in the making of 
local environmental policy.  Furthermore, I aim to investigate the resultant flows of 
environmental resources in the case of the potential Nestlé bottled water facility at Oxbow 
Springs in the Columbia Gorge.  My secondary goals are to both illuminate the clarity and 
accessibility of the process of this particular policy dispute from the position of the general 
public, as well as to continue to postulate the sociology of flows literature through the lens of 
environmental sociology.  What should be noted is that my limited selection of data reflects the 
ongoing nature of the policy and resource dispute which is still ongoing as of the winter of 2017, 
when my research was completed.  Because of this, I will not arrive at an analysis of some “final 
state” of power relations in regards to this case of policy development and resource management, 
but this is arguably fitting for a study of the ongoing power dynamics in the network society.  I 
was fully aware of this limitation when approaching this research endeavor.  
In order to approach the primary goal of my research, I will direct my investigation with 
the following research question: What are the identifiable power dynamics between civil society 
actors, private interests, and state institutions within the networks involved in the making of local 
environmental policy and the resultant resource flows?  
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Data Sources: 
  Interested in this theoretical foundation for analyzing power relations and governance,  
I collected and condensed a body of historical evidence on events and interactions important to 
my focus on policy development and resource flows, which were drawn from a variety of 
publicly accessible sources.  These include published meeting minutes and official documents 
from government agencies, media coverage from established news organizations, and published 
testimony and accounts concerning the policy dispute and relevant actors, as it developed.   
 
Coding and Data Analysis: 
For undertaking an analysis of this research, I first coded this data (which I would 
classify as historical-interactional information) using Castells’ Network Theory of Power, as well 
as considering aspects of power dynamics and the sociology of flows raised by other political 
and environmental sociologists.  In highlighting the power dynamics of interactional networks, I 
have coded all governmental organizations within the state network (including the county and 
municipal levels as they are core organizations of the governance network at their respective 
levels), so as to consider the power dynamics between state and private networks and state and 
civil society networks within this interaction.  By analyzing the interactions between the specific 
organizations and more general networks in question, and the type of power they are utilizing 
(using Castells’ theoretical framework), I hope to investigate the power dynamics between these 
networks and the implications of the findings both for policy development and resource 
management.  I chose this style of data collection, coding, and analysis in order to make my 
inquiry feasible for the time and resources that were available to complete this research.   
Additionally, I chose this methodology with the goal of elucidating the degree to which 
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the power dynamics active in the development of this particular policy dispute are clear and 
accessible to the general public, in order to enhance and acknowledge my experience as both a 
researcher and a concerned citizen.  Last, this research methodology has permitted me 
significantly more time to incorporate and synthesize the theoretical work previously discussed, 
where other methodologies such as semi-structured interviews would have encumbered the 
process with substantial quantitative coding and analysis. 
 While this methodology for collection and analysis is decidedly qualitative, and relies 
both on the accuracy of sourced information and the usefulness of Castell’s intentionally open-
ended Network Theory of Power, one can still draw tentative conclusions regarding this 
particular case study, even if the findings are only conceptually, rather than statistically, 
generalizable.  Simultaneously, by employing more abstract and open-ended theory we may 
emphasize the significance of this particular policy development and public interaction within 
the frame of globalization, as a microcosm of the broader trends discussed previously in the 
literature section. 
After a review of the sourced historical information, I will proceed with an analysis of the 
data, taking as Castells does that “at any given point in time in any given society,” institutions, 
norms, interactions, and their social results, are manifestations of the state of power 
relationships, and reflect both the “institutionalized norms and of the struggles and negotiations 
that challenge the persistence of these norms” (2016:2).  In this way, I am departing from 
traditional content analysis, which seeks to code and analyze the latent meaning of the content, 
often at the individual level.  Instead, as my interest in this study is the broader socio-political 
context and the power dynamics associated with the developing water rights policy, I will 
proceed on the assumption that the relevant social meaning and results of power relationships 
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and interactional dynamics are evidenced in real historical developments, which nonetheless 
often remain obscure until later reflection.  While it would be impossible to collect, and consider 
the totality of relevant data and individual experience within this developing policy dispute, I 
have worked intentionally to collect and compile ample data so as to represent the real, traceable 
socio-historical developments, events, actors and interactions relevant to my disciplinary 
interests in political and environmental sociology. 
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Historical Content in Chronological Order 
The information presented here is a collection of publicly accessible information from a 
combination of sources including state, county and city level official documents, news agencies, 
private interest groups and other third party organizations relevant to this particular policy 
interaction.  I accessed, compiled, summarized and presented the content with the goal of 
illustrating thoroughly and transparently the chronological development of events relevant to 
water rights policy and the proposed bottling plant in the city of Cascade Locks, whatever may 
transpire.  I have taken great care to summarize and include all relevant information from each 
given source, true to the original material, adding quotations where it is necessary.  I have only 
omitted information where source information is redundant or where a more established source is 
sufficient (for example, official documentation of an event may be cited instead of a news source 
reporting on that event).   
The dates and information correspond directly to the source indicated (based on the day 
of publication or public dissemination of the information, and not necessarily the exact date the 
historical events took place, unless noted) and kept as simple as possible for ease of accessibility, 
while still giving proper attribution.  The exception to this is the first and most comprehensive 
source, the “Final Order in Contested Case Approving Additional Points of Diversion,” 
published in 2016 by the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, from which I have included 
information in the order of the chronological development of the historical content.  If there is 
more than one source relevant to a specific date, I added it and indicated a separate source using 
indentation. 
 It should be noted for clarity that there is an important distinction between the water 
right transfer applications (T-11108 and T-11249) and the water right exchange application (T-
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11109) submitted by ODFW to OWRD.  The former applications extended and amended the 
existing ODFW water right, while the latter would give ODFW the right to exchange some of the 
water they have right to access.  
 
Abbreviations: 
CFS: Cubic feet per second (water flow rate) 
ODFW: Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife 
OWRD: Oregon Water Resources Department    
POD: Point of (water) diversion 
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Historical Content: 
1951 - Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW) granted Certificate no. 24625: giving 
water rights to the city of Cascade Locks, authorized to divert up to 10 cubic feet per second 
(cfs) of surface water from Little Herman Creek for its Oxbow Springs fish hatchery.  Little 
Herman Creek is fed by the East, Middle and West springs.  (As of 2008, ODFW has diverted 
water directly from Middle and East Springs “for at least 10 years,” after the water emerges from 
the ground).1 
 
November 19, 2008 – Initial presentation by Nestlé Waters North America to Cascade Locks 
City Council and Port of Cascade Locks Commission on Nestlé’s “Pacific Northwest Project” 
(seeking a spring water bottling facility site in either Washington or Oregon).  Prior to this 
meeting Nestlé contracted a hydrologist to inspect the spring water capacity of the area on two 
different occasions.  The presentation proposed an approximately 250,000 square foot bottling 
facility along with a dedicated facility to produce the bottles, in total representing a $50 million-
dollar investment, which Nestlé initially claimed would support 53 family wage jobs with 
benefits.  “Council and Commission thanked them for coming to the meeting and making the 
presentation, stating that Cascade Locks would welcome them to the community.”2    
 
November 5, 2009 – Food and Water Watch, a national environmental advocacy group, 
circulated a petition in Oregon to pressure the State to refuse the proposed water exchange with 
                                                          
1 French, Dwight. 2016. Final Order in Contested Case Approving Additional Points of Diversion. Salem, Oregon: 
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife. 
2 Bengston, Kristi. 2008. “Joint City of Cascade Locks Council and Port of Cascade Locks Commission Meeting Notes.” 
Retrieved January 20, 2017 (http://portofcascadelocks.org/home-2/port-commission/). 
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the City.  City Administrator Bernard Seeger sent notification to the Governor’s office and 
discussed the petition with General Manager Chuck Daughtry and Carolyn Meece of Business 
Oregon.3   
 
August 27, 2010 – ODFW submitted two application to the Oregon Water Resources 
Department (OWRD).  1) Water Right Transfer application T-11108 would maintain the 
originally authorized point of diversion (POD) on Little Herman Creek, as well as officially 
adding the Middle and East Springs as additional PODs for the originally certified quantity of 
water allowed for diversion (10 cfs).  2) Water Right Exchange application T-11109 would trade 
0.5 cfs of the spring water allotted to ODFW to the City of Cascade Locks, in exchange for 0.5 
cfs of well water.1  
“As part of the proposal, the City would have access to up to 0.5 cfs…from the Oxbow 
Springs to sell to its potential customer, Nestlé Waters, for bottling purposes...If the exchange 
goes through, and [the] project moves forward, [Nestlé] would purchase water from the City like 
any other business, and be subject to the same rules and regulations.”4 
 
September 02, 2010 – While waiting for a study paid for by Nestlé on the effects of the 
proposed well water exchange on fish at the hatchery, to be completed by March 2011, OWRD 
opened up public comment (to close on Sept. 30th 2010) concerning the transfer application 
                                                          
3 Kristi, Bengston. 2009. “Port of Cascade Locks Commission Meeting Notes.” 
 (http://portofcascadelocks.org/home-2/port-commission). 
4 Nestlé Waters North America. n.d. “Nestlé Waters North America Evaluates Potential Spring Bottled Water Plant in 
Pacific Northwest.” 
(https://www.nestlewaterscommunities.com/pnw/sites/default/files/NWNA%20Cascade%20Locks%20Fact%20She
et-1.pdf). 
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proposed by ODFW.  The proposed plant would nearly double property tax collections in the city 
of Cascade Locks (pop. 1,050), garnering support from Cascade Locks leaders and Gov. Ted 
Kulongoski.  The coalition of environmental groups led by Food and Water Watch have pointed 
to other Nestlé plants which have not provided the economic benefits promised by Nestlé, and 
that Nestlé and the State haven’t thoroughly studied the long-term impacts of a bottling plant on 
Cascade Locks’ municipal water supply and Herman Creek itself.  Dwight French, Water Rights 
Administrator for the Oregon Water Resources Department (OWRD), said the agency will 
scrutinize whether the water exchange is truly equal, but that Nestlé is not a party to the 
exchange in question, and the agency will not consider environmental issues around bottled 
water plants.  “We may get comments about whether the plants are a good idea or not,” French 
said, “but this exchange application is not for a bottling plant.”5 
 
April 12, 2011 – ODFW modified its T-11108 rights transfer application from 10 cfs to 0.5 cfs, 
after the public comment period had ended. Complaints issued by protesters about the last-
minute modification to the transfer application were later disregarded in the joint ODFW and 
OWRD legal proceedings based on the technicality of the term “amended,” with ODFW’s 
change to the application taken as an acceptable clerical edit rather than a fundamental 
amendment of the transfer application which would call for an extension of the public comment 
period. 1 
 
May 23, 2011 – ODFW filed a third application to OWRD, Water Rights Transfer Application 
                                                          
5 Learn, Scott. 2010. “Bid by Nestlé to Tap into Cascade Locks Spring Water Open for Public Comment.”  
 The Oregonian, September 2. 
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T-11249, proposing to add the aforementioned additional sites for diversion (Middle and East 
Spring) to the remaining 9.5 of ODFW’s Water right. 1   
 
February 27, 2012 – OWRD issued a preliminary determination to approve the water rights 
transfer applications, T-11108 and T-11249 which replaced the original 1951 certification (no. 
24625). 1 
 
March 29, 2012 – Protesting organizations “Bark” and “Food and Water Watch” challenged 
OWRD determination with counsel Crag Law Center, on account of questionable amendment 
procedures (application revised after the public comment period had ended) as well as 
challenging that the new points of diversion are groundwater sources rather than surface water 
and therefore aren’t permitted under the statutory scheme, among other concerns. 1      
 
 
April 2013 – Food and Water Watch released a fact sheet highlighting the water right exchange  
(T-1109) which would “pave the way” for Nestlé to buy spring water from Cascade Locks at the 
standard municipal water rate, while the Oxbow Springs fish hatchery would in turn offset the 
exchanged 0.5 cfs of spring water with a potential 0.5 cfs of well water from Cascade locks for 
the state-owned hatchery.  While Nestlé plans to bottle approximately 100 million gallons of 
spring water per year under the Arrowhead Brand, approximately an additional 57 million 
gallons per year of Cascade Locks’ municipal tap water (sourced from groundwater/wells) would 
also be bottled under Nestlé’s Pure Life brand.  Pointing to the 2010 USGS study of the region 
evaluating changes in groundwater levels from 1984 to 2009, and a preliminary analysis of the 
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economic issues concerning the question of the proposed bottling plant, the activist coalition is 
adamant about the long-term issues of both declining groundwater reserves and economic 
externalities of the project.6 
 
January 23, 2015 – Instead of obtaining the water through the original avenue of a gallon-for-
gallon trade between the state of Oregon (ODFW) and Cascade Locks city government, which 
would then sell the water to Nestlé, the company wants the state to change its legal right to some 
of the Oxbow water and transfer the rights directly to Cascade Locks.  This tactic would 
eliminate a sticking point in the permitting process for: where a gallon for gallon trade between 
ODFW and the City of Cascade Locks officially requires the consideration of how a trade of 
resources might negatively impact the public (transfer application T-11109).  Instead, 
transferring the rights would require that ODFW renege a promise it made to not forfeit its water 
right.  “Under Nestlé’s direction the Cascade Locks City Council voted last week to seek the 
Oregon Water Resources Department’s permission to swap a portion of its well water right for 
0.5 cubic feet per second of the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife’s right to draw 10 cubic 
feet per second from Oxbow Springs…Under the so-called [water rights] cross transfer, ODFW 
would supply its hatchery with city well water during times when Oxbow’s flow is low, and the 
city would sell its spring water to Nestlé for a couple bucks per 1,000 gallons…Nestlé in turn 
would sell the water to consumers for hundreds to thousands of times that amount.”  Also, the 
city council voted to offer negotiated pricing for water customers who use more than 250,000 
gallons per month, a level only Nestlé would reach, paying less per unit volume than Cascade 
                                                          
6 Food and Water Watch. 2013. “Keep Nestlé Water Bottling Plant Out of the Columbia River Gorge.” 
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Locks residents.7 
 
April 10, 2015 – ODFW Agrees to transfer part of its water right at Oxbow Springs to Cascade 
Locks.  “Cascade Locks City Administrator Gordon Zimmerman said the city and state wildlife 
agency jointly submitted paperwork Friday morning to initiate a water rights cross transfer, with 
the state trading spring water for the city’s well water.”8  
 
September 21, 2015 – Activists in Hood River County filed a ballot initiative, the “Hood River 
Water Protection Measure” (14-55) aimed at preventing the Nestlé Corporation from bottling in 
the Columbia River Gorge.  The initiative would effectively ban commercial bottled water 
operations in the county.  While the Cascade Locks City Council has approved the bottling plan, 
the deal still requires the state’s consent (OWRD).  Along with the activist group “Local Water 
Alliance”, leaders of the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs questioned the deal in a letter 
to Governor Kate Brown and tribal members staged rallies and a hunger strike in protest of 
Nestlé.  “Because the water resources department cannot consider public interests when deciding 
whether to allow Nestlé’s plan to move forward, it’s unlikely the company’s opponents could 
stop the plan through state-level action.”9   
 
                                                          
7 House, Kelly. 2015. “Bottled Water Wars: Nestlé’s Latest Move in Cascade Locks Sparks Outcry from Opponents.” The 
Oregonian (OregonLive), January 23. 
(http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/201S/01/bottled_water_wars_nestles_lat.hlml). 
8 House, Kelly. 2015. “ODFW Agrees to New Approach for Nestlé Bottled Water Plant in Cascade Locks.” The 
Oregonian (OregonLive), April 10. 
(http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2015/04/odfw_agress_to_new_approach_fo.html). 
9 House, Kelly. 2015. “Hood River County Ballot Initiative Seeks to Block Nestlé Water Bottling Plant.” The Oregonian 
(OregonLive), September 21. 
(http://oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2015/09/hood_river_ballot_measure_seek.html). 
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November 06, 2015 – After a letter from Oregon Gov. Kate Brown to ODFW director Curt 
Melcher asking ODFW to withdraw the agency’s application to transfer part of its water right at 
Oxbow Springs, citing concerns of regional drought and limited public recourse within water 
rights swaps, ODFW “will scrap its latest strategy to free up water for a Nestlé bottled water 
plant in Cascade Locks, in favor of an approach that lets regulators consider the public impacts 
of relinquishing water in the midst of a drought.”10   
 
December 23, 2015 – OWRD referred the matter of the rights transfer applications (in 
conjunction with ODFW, seeking approval of T-11108 and T-11249) to the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH) for a consolidated contested case hearing. 1 
 
December 30, 2015 – The “Hood River Water Protection Measure” is approved for the ballot 
after activists turned in more than three times the number of signatures required.  Set to appear 
on the primary ballot in May 2016, measure 14-55 would ban commercial operations bottling 
more than 1,000 gallons a day in Hood River County.11  
 
April 12, 2016 – Cascade Locks City Council passed a resolution (6-1 in favor) officially 
opposing Hood River County ballot measure 14-55 as a “direct threat to the city’s home rule,” 
                                                          
10 House, Kelly. 2015. “Gov. Kate Brown Asks for New Approach to Nestlé Water Deal.” The Oregonian (OregonLive), 
November 6. Retrieved February 5, 2017 
(http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2015/11/gov_kate_brown_asks_wildlife_d.html#incart_river_ho
me). 
11 Kullgren, Ian. 2015. “Measure to Block Nestlé Bottling Plant Headed to May 2016 Ballot.” The Oregonian 
(OregonLive), December 30. Retrieved February 5, 2017 
(http://oregonlive.com/politics/index/ssf/2015/12/ballot_measure_to_ban_nestle_b.html).  
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and out of concern for its economic future.12 
 
May 17, 2016 – Hood River County voters passed ballot measure 14-55 with 69% in favor, the 
nation’s first-ever successful initiative to prevent water bottling plants bottling more than 1,000 
gallons of day.13   
 
May 24, 2016 – Despite the overwhelming support for the Hood River County ballot measure, 
the majority of the Cascade Locks City Council voted to direct attorneys to consider new 
strategies to close the deal.  Campaign finance records show Nestlé poured more than $100,000 
into fighting the ballot measure through a political action committee and an industry group.  
While 69% voted in favor of 14-55 in Hood River County, only 42% of voters supported it in the 
Cascade Locks precinct.14  
 
June 10, 2016 – Senior Administrative Law Judge Allen (on behalf of the Oregon Office of 
Administrative Hearings) issued his ruling on the OWRD and ODFW Joint Motion for Summary 
Determination and Proposed Order, approving the OWRD preliminary determination approving 
right transfer applications T-11108 and T-11249, while water right exchange application  
T-11109 remains unapproved.1 
                                                          
12 Mulvihill, Patrick. 2016. “Cascade Locks Council Votes against 14-55.” Hood River News, April 12. Retrieved 
February 6, 2017 (http://www.hoodrivernews.com/news/2016/apr/13/cascade-locks-council-votes-against-14-55/). 
13 Loew, Tracy. 2016. “Hood River Voters Block Netle Bottling Plant.” Statesman Journal, May 18. Retrieved February 5, 
2017 (http://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/tech/science/environment/2016/05/17/hood-river-voters-block-nestle-
bottling-plant/84340262/). 
14 Brousseau, Carli. 2016. “Election Doesn’t Persuade Cascade Locks to Abandon Proposed Nestlé Deal.” The Oregonian 
(OregonLive), May 24. Retrieved February 5, 2017 (http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-
news/index.ssf/2016/05/election_doesnt_persuade_casca.html). 
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July 7, 2016 – Bark and Food and Water Watch filed their Exceptions to the Proposed Order.                 
No responses were filed to Protestants’ Exceptions. 1 
 
August 4, 2016 – In Waitsburg, Washington (pop. 1,230) the mayor stepped down amid 
accusations of backroom deals with Nestlé and protests over a preliminary plan for a bottling 
plant similar to the one proposed in Cascade Locks (roughly 150 million gallons of water each 
year to be extracted from local springs and groundwater wells).  Some residents had called for 
the mayor’s resignation after the Waitsburg City Council learned in July that he and other city 
staff had met privately with Nestlé, and that the company planned to help repair leaky pipes near 
the town’s springs without a contract.  An online petition opposing the deal had received 1,261 
signatures as of Thursday, that week.15 
 
September 21, 2016 – Representatives from regional tribes, local activists and supporters rallied 
in front of the Oregon State Capitol building in Salem as the city manager of Cascade Locks has 
“directed staff to review the legal ramifications and remedies available to the city to continue the 
relationship with Nestlé Waters North America.”  The protesters were concerned that despite the 
county vote on measure 14-55, the governor and ODFW would not honor the ballot measure 
results, and would seek alternative avenues for continuing with the Nestlé proposed plan. 16    
 
                                                          
15 Flatt, Courtney. 2017. “Nestlé Stirs Contraversy With New Plan for Northwest Water Bottling Plant.” August 4. 
Retrieved February 5, 2017 (http://www.opb.org/news/article/nestle-controversy-plan-northwest-water-bottling-
plant-/).              
16 The Associated Press. 2016. “Protesters: It’s Time to Put Nestlé Bottling Plant Ambitions to Rest.” The Oregonian 
(OregonLive), September 21. Retrieved February 7, 2017 (http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-
news/index.ssf/2016/09/protesters_its_time_to_put_nes.html). 
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October 29, 2016 – Two of the three of ODFW’s water right transfer requests were granted by 
OWRD after the legal proceedings of the Oregon Office of Administrative Hearings (approving 
water right transfer applications T-11108 and T-11249).  T-11108 added the two points of 
diversion (Middle and East Springs) to clarify where ODFW may pull water from.  T-11249 split 
the ODFW water right from one right to 10 cubic feet per second (cfs) into two rights, one for 
9.5 cfs and one for 0.5 cfs, the latter of which could be involved in the Nestlé bottling plant.  
Before it would be possible to sell the water to Nestlé, the city of Cascade Locks and the ODFW 
need to officially agree to exchange water from the springs for municipal tap (well) water, and 
the exchange must be approved by the Oregon Water Resources Department.  Cascade Locks 
City Administrator Gordon Zimmerman said that the city actually selling water to Nestlé is still 
“four or five steps down the road,” and that, “it could be two, three, four years.”  The county 
level ballot measure that passed is the main thing standing in the way of the plan for the plant 
going forward.  A 60-day appeal period was opened after the transfer request was approved.17
                                                          
17 Roth, Sarah and Pat Dooris. 2016. “State Approves Next Step for Nestlé Water Bottling Plant in Gorge, despite County 
Vote.” KGW, November 3. Retrieved February 5, 2017 (http://www.kgw.com/news/local/state-paves-way-for-
nestle-water-bottling-plans-despite-county-vote/347240019). 
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Analysis of Historical Content (Tables) 
 
 
Date  Actor Interface  Mode of Power Interaction  Rights/Policy Development 
1951 State Org (State of Oregon, OWRD) 
→ State Org (ODFW) 
4) Network-Making Power 
(Programming: establishing a state 
resource rights network) 
ODFW awarded cert. 24625, giving right to 10 
cubic feet per second (cfs) spring water for use 
at the Oxbow Springs Fish Hatchery. 
Nov. 19, 2008 Private Interest Org (Nestlé)  
→ State/Municipal Org (CCL) 
4) Network-Making Power 
(Switching: aligning networks) 
Beginning of cooperation of private and state 
networks (aligning of common goal: economic 
growth). 
Nov. 5, 2009 Civil Soc./Collective (FWW, others)  
→ State Org (State of Oregon, Hood 
River County) 
1) Networking Power 
(Excluding the CCL from state 
resource rights network)  
FWW circulating a petition in Oregon to 
pressure the state to refuse the proposed water 
rights exchange with the City.   
State and Municipal Organizations:                                    
(OWRD): Oregon Water Resources 
Department 
(ODFW): Oregon Department of Fish and 
Wildlife 
(OAH): Oregon Office of Administrative 
Hearings 
(CCL): City Council of Cascade Locks 
 
Civil Society Actors: 
(LWA): Local Water Alliance 
(FWW): Food and Water Watch 
 
Modes of Power Interaction: 
1) Networking Power: The gatekeeping power of actors and organizations within core 
networks to include or exclude other actors and organizations from networks. 
2) Network Power: The power of the communication protocols in a given network 
over the components of the network. 
3) Networked Power:  The power of programmed goals and structural hierarchy of 
actors and organizations, established during the formation of a given network. 
4) Network-Making Power:  The ability of social actors and organizations to: a) 
establish and “program” the goals of a network, and b) the ability to “switch”, align, 
connect and ensure strategic cooperation between actors and networks by sharing 
common goals.      
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Date  Actor Interface  Mode of Power Interaction  Rights/Policy Development 
Aug. 27, 2010 State Org (ODFW) 
→ State Org (OWRD) 
3) Networked Power 
(Aligned programming/goals of 
established resource rights 
network) 
Two rights applications submitted to OWRD by 
ODFW. 
T-11108: Adding sources to original 10 (cfs) 
right. 
T-11109: Exchanging 0.5 (cfs) of spring water 
allotted to ODFW to CCL, for 0.5 (cfs) of well 
water.  
Sep. 02, 2010 Civil Soc. Actors/Collective (FWW, 
others)  
→ State Org (OWRD) 
2) Network Power  
(Legal/communication protocols 
exempted public comments 
concerning proposed bottling 
plant) 
Public contestation limited to the content of 
transfer applications due to legal protocols. 
Apr. 12, 2011 State Org (ODFW)  
→ State Org (OWRD) 
2) Network Power 
(Legal/communication protocols 
allowed modified transfer 
application without contestation) 
ODFW modified rights transfer application T-
11108 from 10 (cfs) to 0.5 (cfs).  This 
modification was accepted by OWRD as a 
clerical edit rather than a fundamental 
amendment (which would require reopening the 
public comment period). 
May 23, 2011 State Org (ODFW)  
→ State Org (OWRD) 
3) Networked Power  
(Established resource 
rights/governance network)  
 
ODFW filed a third rights transfer application.  
T-11249: Effectively splitting the original 10 cfs 
ODFW water right into two spring water rights 
(T-11108’s 0.5 cfs and T-11249’s 9.5 cfs)  
Feb. 27, 2012 State Org (OWRD)  
→ State Org (ODFW) 
3) Networked Power 
(Established resource  
rights/ governance network)  
 
OWRD issued preliminary determination to 
approve rights transfer applications T-11108 
and T-11249, replacing original 1951 rights 
certificate no. 24625. 
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Date  Actor Interface  Mode of Power Interaction  Rights/Policy Development 
Mar. 29, 2012 Civil Soc. Actors/Collective (FWW, 
Bark)  
→ State Org (OWRD) 
2) Network Power  
(Legal/communication protocols) 
Protestant organizations challenged OWRD 
determination on account of questionable 
amendment procedures and that newly approved 
points of diversion were outside of ODFW 
permit.  Contestation did not reverse the 
determination. 
April 2013 Civil Soc. Actors/Collective (FWW) 
→ Civil Soc. Actors/Collective 
(General Public) 
4) Network-Making Power  
(Building civil society/public 
opposition network) 
Growing network of public actors, framing 
policy dispute within broader 
environmental/drought context, seeking goals 
alignment with other groups. 
Jan. 23, 2015 Private Interest Org (Nestlé)  
→ State/Municipal Org (CCL) 
3) Networked Power  
(Aligned State and Private 
networks, CCL and Nestlé) 
With Nestlé’s encouragement, CCL voted in 
favor of seeking ODFW permission to swap a 
portion of CCL’s well water right for a portion 
of ODFW’s 10 (cfs) spring water right (0.5 cfs 
for 0.5 cfs).  This would eliminate a sticking 
point in the permitting process, requiring 
OWRD to consider how the effect of a trade 
might negatively affect the public.  Instead of 
CCL and ODFW keeping their previously 
determined rights and trading water, this would 
go back on a public promise ODFW made to 
not forfeit its water right in any form. 
CCL also voted to offer a negotiated pricing for 
water for customers who use more than 250,000 
gallons per month (a level only Nestlé would 
reach), paying less per unit volume than 
Cascade Locks residents.  
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Date  Actor Interface  Mode of Power Interaction  Rights/Policy Development 
Apr. 10, 2015 State/Municipal Org (CCL)  
→ State Org (OWRD) 
3) Networked Power 
(Established resource rights 
network)  
 
ODFW agreed to swap its water right to 0.5 
(cfs) of spring water (of original 10 cfs allotted) 
for CCL’s water right to 0.5 (cfs) well water.  
The city and state agencies jointly submitted 
paperwork to OWRD to initiate the water rights 
cross transfer. 
Sep. 21, 2015  Civil Soc. Actors/Collective (LWA, 
others)  
→ County Org (Hood River County) 
1) Networking Power 
(Excluding commercial water 
bottlers from Hood River County) 
Activists filed ballot initiative 14-55, that would 
effectively ban commercial water bottling in 
Hood River County.  While the CCL has 
approved the plan for the plant, the deal requires 
OWRD (state network) consent. 
Sep. 21, 2015 Civil Soc. Actors/Collective 
(Activists and Leaders of 
Confederated Tribes of Warm 
Springs)  
→ State Org (State of Oregon, Gov. 
Brown) 
4) Network-Making Power 
(Switching: seeking alignment of 
civil society and state networks) 
As OWRD cannot consider public interests in 
their decision to allow or prevent Nestlé’s plan 
and the transfer applications submitted by 
ODFW, activists sent a letter and staged rallies 
in hopes that Oregon Governor Kate Brown 
would prevent the plan from moving forward. 
Nov. 06, 2015 State Org (State of Oregon, Gov. 
Brown)  
→ State Org (ODFW, Dir. Melcher) 
3) Networked Power 
(Hierarchy of state organizations) 
ODFW scraps plan to swap water rights after a 
letter from Gov. Brown asked the agency to 
withdraw its rights cross-transfer application 
citing concerns of regional drought and limited 
public recourse within water rights swaps. 
Dec. 23, 2015 State Org (OWRD)  
→ State Org (OAH) 
2) Network Power 
(Appeal through state network 
protocols to proceed regardless of 
network’s components)  
OWRD referred the matter of the rights transfer 
to the OAH for a consolidated (OWRD and 
ODFW) case hearing. 
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Date  Actor Interface  Mode of Power Interaction  Rights/Policy Development 
Dec. 30, 2015 Civil Soc. Actors/Collective (various 
activists)  
→ State/County Org (Hood River 
County) 
2) Network Power 
(Appeal through State network 
protocols to proceed regardless of 
network’s components) 
Ballot measure 14-55, that would ban 
commercial bottling of more than 1,000 gallons 
a day in Hood River County, is approved for the 
ballot after activists turn in three times the 
number of required signatures. 
Apr. 12, 2016 State/Municipal Org (CCL)  
→ State/County Org (Hood River 
County) 
2) Network Power 
(Appeal through State network 
protocols to proceed regardless of 
network’s components) 
Cascade Locks City Council voted to pass a 
resolution officially opposing Hood River 
County Ballot Measure 14-55.  
May 17, 2016 Civil Soc. Actors/Collective (Voters)  
→ County Org (Hood River County) 
2) Network Power 
(Appeal to state network protocols 
to proceed regardless of network’s 
components) 
Ballot measure 14-55 passes in Hood River 
County with 69% of participants voting in 
favor.  This is the nation’s first-ever successful 
initiative to prevent water bottling plants from 
bottling more than 1,000 gallons per day.  
May 24, 2016 Private Interest Org (Nestlé)  
→ State/County and Municipal Orgs 
(CCL and Hood River County)   
4) Networking-Making Power 
(Switching: connecting state and 
private networks, aligning 
common goals and cooperating) 
Campaign records show Nestlé poured more 
than 100,000 into fighting ballot measure 14-55 
through a political action committee and an 
industry group.  CCL voted to direct attorneys 
to consider new strategies to take Nestlé’s goal 
to fruition. 
Jun. 10, 2016 State Org (OAH, Judge Allen)  
→ State Orgs (OWRD and ODFW)   
3) Networked Power 
(Common governance goals of 
state networks) 
Oregon Office of Administrative Hearings ruled 
in the OWRD and ODFW joint case, approving 
the OWRD preliminary determination 
approving transfer applications T-11108 and  
T-11249. 
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Date  Actor Interface  Mode of Power Interaction  Rights/Policy Development 
Jul. 7, 2016 Civil Soc. Actors/Collective (Bark 
and FWW)  
→ State Org (OAH) 
2) Network Power  
(Power of protocols over 
components of the network) 
Exceptions to the transfer approval were filed 
by activist groups after the approval.  No 
response or recourse was filed relating the 
protestant’s exceptions. 
Aug. 4, 2016 Private Interest Org (Nestlé)  
→ State/Municipal Org (City of 
Waitsburg, Washington) 
4) Network-Making Power  
(Programming: creating network 
of state and private organizations) 
The Mayor of Waitsburg, Washington stepped 
down after accusations of backroom deals with 
Nestlé and protestation of a preliminary plan for 
a water bottling plant similar to the one 
proposed in Cascade Locks. 
Sep. 21, 2016 Civil Soc. Actors/Collective (Local 
Tribal Reps, general public and 
activists)  
→ State Org (State of Oregon) 
3) Networked Power 
(Appeal to powered organizations 
within State network) 
Rally staged at Oregon State Capitol where 
protesters were concerned that despite the 
county vote on 14-55, that the governor and 
ODFW wouldn’t honor the measure, and seek 
alternative avenues for continuing Nestlé’s 
proposed plan. 
Oct. 29, 2016 State Org (OWRD)  
→ State Org (ODFW) 
3) Networked Power 
(Common goals of state network 
organizations) 
OWRD approved ODFW’s requested water 
rights transfers T-1108 and T-11249. 
T-11108: Adding additional diversion sources 
middle and east springs to ODFW’s 10 (cfs) 
water right. 
T-11249: Splitting ODFW’s water right into 
two rights, one for 9.5 (cfs) and one for 0.5 
(cfs).  
Rights exchange application T-11109 remains 
unapproved. 
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Analysis and Observations 
 Through my research on this resource rights dispute, and encouraged by the scholarship I 
touched on in the literature review, I came to observe two main intersections of the relevant 
networks which are involved in this power interaction.  The first significant network intersection 
I observed was between the private sector (in this case, Nestlé Waters North America) and the 
state sector (the municipal government of Cascade Locks, the Oregon Department of Fish and 
Wildlife and the Oregon Water Resources Department, to only name some of the key players), 
which I go so far as to consider as an integrated private-state network insofar as the private and 
state networks appear to operate under aligned goals, which I will first consider in the following 
analysis section.  The second significant network intersection I observed was between the public 
network (often the most amorphous due to less formal organization) and the state network.  In 
order to avoid confusion between the “public” (citizens, voters, activists, and grassroots 
organizations) and the “public sector” which would include the state organizations, I will refer to 
the general public as much as possible as “civil society”, but when the term “public” is used it is 
not in reference to or including the public sector/governmental institutions.   
This distinction highlights an important overarching conclusion of this particular 
research, which confirms assertions by globalization (CITS) scholars, that the role of the state 
has moved away from a role as the “governor” and increasingly is forced to play as the 
“gamekeeper” at the cites of struggle between large corporations and public bodies.    Here we 
see David Harvey’s geopolitical climate reviewed in the literature section, where civil society 
and public bodies the world over are increasingly at odds with the private sector at the nexus that 
the state represents, holding the rules of the game (rights, laws, protocols, etc.) in terms of 
socioeconomic and environmental resource activities.    
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Private-State Networking and Policy Developments 
 Extrapolating from the information presented in the historical content section, it is clear 
that from 2008 onward, Nestlé’s networking activity with the City Council of Cascade Locks (as 
well as the Port Commission of Cascade Locks) was central to the development of water rights 
policy.  Supporting Castell’s theoretical framework —that network-making power is often the 
most crucial aspect of power in the network society— the initial presentation by Nestlé Waters 
North America to the City Council and Port Commission demonstrates the early network 
construction that proved to be crucial for the continual progress towards the bottling plant and 
necessary transfer of water rights to either Nestlé or Cascade Locks.  That is, the proposal 
presentation documented in the source from 2008 exhibits Nestlé’s network-making power, 
which in this case was an aligning of private network and state network goals (at the municipal 
level), on an economic basis.  By switching or linking the traditionally-separate state and private 
networks, Nestlé would operate through this alliance, from the convergence point in their 
interests, to work on pre-existing state institutions.  
While the state organizations (be it ODFW, the City Council of Cascade locks, or even 
the Governor’s office) may have been organizationally undisturbed in the making of this 
particular private-state network, broader public interest in a return to a healthy local economy 
(which saw its heyday before the evaporation of timber activity in the region), increased property 
tax revenues, and job growth, were easily alignable to Nestlé Waters North America’s goals of 
resource accumulation and a location for profitable capital investment.  The creation of what we 
will call the private-state network was of chief importance in this interaction, and as it was 
programmed to the aligned goals of the City Council, Port Commission and Nestlé, was clearly 
oriented towards the building of the bottling plant and the integration of local resources into the 
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global economy.   
The dominant economically-based power of Nestlé Waters North America is further 
evidenced by the vote by the City of Cascade Locks (documented by the January 23 2015 
source) to seek ODFW permission to swap of portion of the city’s well water right, as well as the 
developments of transfer applications submitted by ODFW.  With the private-state network 
cooperating under the goal of moving towards building Nestlé’s planned bottling plant, the city 
council’s vote in favor of seeking ODFW permission to swap a portion of the Cascade Locks 
municipal well water right for a portion of ODFW’s spring water right, demonstrates the 
networked power active in this alliance once it was formed.  In order to eliminate an obstacle to 
the bottling plant permitting process, which had become the ultimate program goal of this 
private-state network, the city now sought to swap a portion of its water right, forgoing and 
subordinating other publicly-oriented or environmentally-oriented goals.  This point is further 
supported by the January 23 2015 source documenting the Cascade Locks City Council vote, as 
we can see that during the same meeting the city council also voted in favor of offering a 
negotiated pricing for water for customers using more than 250,000 gallons per month, a level of 
use that no public interest or citizen would come close to.  The vote in the January 23 2015 
source demonstrates a change in the tactic of the private-state network, as ODFW’s transfer 
application T-11109 had become stalled on the technicality of OWRD’s necessity of considering 
how a gallon for gallon resource trade (instead of a rights transfer) might negatively affect the 
public.  
From the earlier source, documenting on February, 27 2012 of OWRD’s preliminary 
determination to approve ODFW applications T-11249 and T-11108, we can see the necessary 
change of tactic by the private-state network to fulfil the dominant programming of the network 
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(building the bottling plant).  The preliminary determination by the Oregon Water Resources 
Department to approve ODFW’s water transfer applications T-11108 (approving two additional 
diversion sources for the original 10 cfs ODFW water right) and T-11249 (splitting the original 
10 cfs water right into two ODFW rights, one for 9.5 cfs and one for 0.5 cfs) but not T-11109 
(trading 0.5 cfs of ODFW spring water for 0.5 cfs of Cascade Locks well water, without 
transferring rights to Cascade Locks), shows the necessity of switching resource acquisition 
tactics, as T-11109 has not been approved to date.  While the state agencies, ODFW and OWRD 
were (from the information that I was able to gather) not as directly influenced by 
communications with Nestlé as was the municipal government of Cascade Locks, these state-
level organizations were effectively within the power dynamic of the private-state network.   
I argue that ODFW, OWRD and other state-level agencies were functioning as part of the 
private-state network insofar as their relevant interests were in common with the city’s: namely, 
the necessary management of local resources and rights/access that had been aligned to the goal 
(introduced to the newly formed private-state network in 2008) of integrating local resources into 
the global economy for both state revenue and private profit.  While the networked power 
dynamics within the state institutional structure didn’t totally yield to Nestlé (manifest in T-
11109 stalling due to the state network’s public concerns), we can see that once the private-state 
network was programmed, “the network has the capability to perform efficiently and reconfigure 
itself to achieve its goals” (Castells, 2016:12).  This is evidenced by the information from May 
23 2011, with ODFW filing the third transfer application T-11249 in order to circumvent the 
issue of considering the public effects of a resources trade. 
Between the actions of the Cascade Locks City Council and the Oregon Department of 
Fish and Wildlife, we can see that different levels of the state network were actively working 
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towards the goals of the private-state network.  With ODFW modifying and creating new 
resource-rights transfer applications, the legal groundwork was being laid so that the city could 
attain right or access to the spring water that was coveted by a multinational firm.  The end 
result, in terms of policy and resource flows, of this private-state network cooperation has yet to 
materialize and appears to be years from either canning or approving the bottling plant plan.  
However, what is clear is that as early as 2008, a private-state network had been formed toward a 
particular project.  Although the planned bottling plant has yet to get the green light from the 
state-network (as the Hood River County ballot measure 14-55 has currently superseded the 
power of the any of the government agencies or offices, to legally bar the access desired by 
Nestlé), state network activities including the rights transfer applications and their resulting 
changes in resource management had clearly been motivated under the aligned goal of the 
private-state network.  This motivation was based in economic power (the potential investment 
provided by Nestlé Waters North America), to commodify and integrate the local water resource 
into the global economy.  
 
Public/Civil Society-State Networking and Policy Developments 
However, one should not adopt a unilateral conception of the power dynamics in this 
policy and resource-rights dispute.  Civil society (public) activists, environmental collective 
groups and local political organizations employed several counter-power strategies in combatting 
the Nestlé-proposed program.  Of these, the network-making power of public activist groups and 
civil society actors should not be overlooked, as the efforts of the Local Water Alliance, Food 
and Water Watch, Bark, and the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, among others, represent 
the backbone of the counter-power efforts with strategic cooperation toward a common goal of 
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preventing the construction of the bottling plant.  
Network-making power was even escalated to the Governor’s office when activists 
staged a protest and rally hoping to convince the Governor (and in turn the rest of the state 
network) that its goals should be aligned with the public/civil-society network more than the 
private network.  This was after the City of Cascade Locks had officially approved the plan for 
the bottling plant and necessary changes in resource management, as documented in the 
information from the September 21 2015 source.  This counter-power network-making strategy 
of goals alignment appears to have been temporarily effective because ODFW officially 
scrapped its plan to swap the water rights after receiving a letter from the Governor’s office that 
cited concerns of regional drought and limited public recourse after a rights transfer, following 
the hierarchal dynamic of the networked power in the state network (documented by the 
November 6 2015 source).  
        Despite this official desistence by ODFW claiming that it would scrap its plan and 
pursue avenues that would allow for public recourse in times of drought, it appears that the 
private-state network and public (civil society) networks both continued to seek avenues to 
achieve their goals, evidenced in the December 23 2015 and December 30 2015 sources, as both 
networks appealed to the legal protocols built into the state network.  While OWRD appealed to 
the higher authority of the Oregon Office of Administrative Hearings in a consolidated case with 
ODFW concerning the preliminary determination by OWRD (approving the transfer applications 
T-11108 and T-11249), civil society activists went to work to collect and submit enough 
signatures to qualify a measure for the Hood River County ballot (14-55) that would ban 
commercial bottling operations of more than 1,000 gallons per day in the county (which includes 
the city of Cascade Locks).  I classified both of these activities as part of the dynamic of network 
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power because here, both the private-state network and public (civil society) network are 
attempting to harness the existing power of the legislative protocols and power of legislation 
built into the state structure, over its particular components, in order to fulfil their respective 
goals.  The goals of the state network had been aligned towards moving forward on building a 
bottling plant, and despite the disapproval of Governor Kate Brown, pursued potential legal 
protocols that would override the Governor’s position.  At almost the same time, the public 
network of activists and civil society organizations (in a counter-power pursuit of the opposite 
result) were seeking to use the network power of the legal protocols of the state network that 
would assert county level legislation over municipal level activity.  Both of these counter-power 
activities appear to have been effective for their network’s respective goals, if only in that 
without them, their respective avenues to successful policy change would have significantly 
withered. 
  This dynamic of network power had been recurrently important for public civil society 
actors and groups trying to access the state network throughout the dispute.  Several legal 
proceedings, one of which the September 2 2010 source documents, were the site for these 
power-dependent interactions where public contestation of the activities of ODFW and OWRD 
were confined to the content of the transfer applications, due to the communication protocols of 
the legal proceedings.  In this particular instance, public contestation voiced by civil society 
members and activist organizations about the proposed bottling plant and the potential sale of 
municipal public resources to a private international corporation were completely dismissed from 
legal proceedings, as legitimate protest was limited by legal protocols, to the content of the rights 
transfer applications in question.  As Nestlé was not an official party to these proceedings 
between ODFW and OWRD (applying for a rights transfer), public comments either 
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disapproving or approving the bottling plant were legally irrelevant. 
 While there were some instances where the public activist network (relatively 
noncentralized) and state network had aligned goals, public actors ended up using what 
networking power they had in trying to first exclude the City of Cascade Locks from the state 
resource rights network and then to exclude large water bottling operations from Hood River 
County.  Food and Water Watch and other civil society activists began circulating a petition in 
Oregon to try to pressure the State of Oregon to refuse the proposed water rights exchange with 
the City of Cascade Locks (referenced in the November 5 2009 source).  Without the network 
power of legal protocols over the components of the state network, however, the power of this 
action couldn’t go beyond public pressure.  In what is likely the most important counter-power 
interaction to date, the first September 21 2015 source documents how the Local Water Alliance 
and other activists operationalized the network power of county legislation (ballot measure 14-
55) to assert public networking power and ban commercial water bottling in Hood River County.  
While the private and state networks appear to be considerably more aligned by their shared goal 
of constructing the bottling plant thus far, the ballot measure represents an important counter-
power action as public civil society activists hope it will assert the power of publicly-interested 
legislation over the privately-designed plan within the state network.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 My interest in this issue relates to the connection between social processes and 
environmental/resource processes, and the dynamics of power that become evident through 
sociopolitical activity surrounding the use of resources.  Reflecting back on the literature I 
reviewed, I assert that we can place this local policy dispute squarely within the larger context of 
economic globalization and the powered and counter-powered interference of private and public 
social networks in an atmosphere where governance structures have not caught up to the 
financial, operational, and politically influential activities made possible by the technological 
revolution as identified by Stiglitz, Castells, and others.  In this context, we should acknowledge 
the way the state network’s goals were aligned to Nestlé’s plan (especially the City of Cascade 
Locks) via its concerns about property tax income and government revenues, job growth, and 
increased economic activity in the City of Cascade Locks.  Cascade Locks had grown in the past 
through timber export and processing activities, and when approached by a potential sum of 
investment money and economic activity in the region, the best interest of the government of 
Cascade Locks (and in turn, the cooperative structures of the rest of the state network) was to 
support the plan.  This is just one local example of a pattern emergent all over the globe, as 
“regions, under the impulse of their governments and business elites, have restructured 
themselves to compete in the global economy, and they have established networks of cooperation 
between regional institutions and region-based companies” (Castells, 2000:412).  Especially in 
places that are not key nodes of financial activity, the impetus of economic activity and capital 
investment is all the more powerful and harder to resist. 
 Although not discussed in the analytical section, the August 4 2016 source documents 
how, after the successful May 2016 ballot measure in Hood River County, Nestlé had also 
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approached the Mayor and government of the small town of Waitsburg, Washington with a 
proposal and plan for a bottling plant that was very similar to the one proposed for the City of 
Cascade Locks.  Here it is useful to reference Castells conception of the spatial logic of the 
network society, in which Nestlé’s financial operations in the space of flows were simply 
interested in locating a suitable place for capital investment and access to spring water for 
commodification, regardless of the specific location the plant might be built at.  This meant that 
the governmental structures in at least these two locations (and perhaps more) were effectively 
put into competition for the investment and economic activity that might accompany the bottling 
plant.  While the economically-based power of the private network gave the potential material 
support for the planned plant, the state network was the gatekeeper of the social/legal support for 
the green-lighting of the plan.  In this way, while both financial organizations and governmental 
organizations are undoubtedly the core of the network society, in places with established state 
governance (be it municipal, county, state or federal), international economic actors must also 
appeal to and work within local state network structures.     
This may mean that local politically-based power still has some sovereignty over global 
economically-based power (in reference to the Marxian-Weberian conceptual dichotomy of 
power), but in cases where our larger governance systems are uncoordinated, capital investment 
may flow to less established state structures with weaker regulations, or with less public 
contestation, to find the path of least resistance for often-exploitative investment.  This has the 
effect of putting place-bounded localities (and state structures) in a disempowered position and 
into competition for spatially unbounded investment flows.  So then, while private networks 
must appeal to state networks in order to achieve their goals, state networks that are inherently 
interested in their economic stability are easily alignable to the shared goal of economic growth, 
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even if economic growth in a case like the proposed bottling plant in Cascade Locks heavily 
favors private networks over those of state and public civil society networks.   
As noted in the literature section, while Nestlé is known for achieving water 
commodification in a variety of ways, including outright acquisition of water rights, increasingly 
it extracts spring water as the, “…customer of local public water utilities, but with long term 
contractual access rights” (Jaffee and Newman, 2013:12).  Where public networks and actors 
approached the state network at the municipal, county and state level with concerns regarding the 
sale of traditionally the non-market good of water, and the long term social and environmental 
impacts this might have, their goals and interests were often subordinated or excluded through 
the networking power of the state network structure and the network power of legal protocols.  
While the method of Nestlé’s capital accumulation fluctuated from rights acquisition to 
becoming a water customer of the City, I argue that this is still accurately described by David 
Harvey’s concept of accumulation by dispossession, the process of releasing public assets at a 
very low price which private networks can then turn to profitable use.  In this local interaction, 
we can see that, “…the power of the state is frequently used to force such processes through even 
against popular will” (Harvey, 2003:148).     
 
 Recognizing that this political dispute has yet to come to a final resolution, and that I 
have only scratched the surface of this issue and the depth and arrangement of the networks 
discussed; nevertheless, we may still draw some important conclusions.  Firstly, Castells’ 
theoretical framework of power was useful both in guiding my research and identifying the 
potential and active power dynamics between actors, organizations and networks relevant to this 
policy dispute.  In coding my research data so as to evaluate the interactions between private, 
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state and public networks, I have painted at a picture of power dynamics within the network 
society as non-static and open to popular resistance.   
Based in this framework, I was able to conclude that in interactions where the state and 
private networks were functioning under a cooperative set of goals, the private economic basis of 
power motivated the state network.  Conversely, when state network goals, or structures and 
protocols (organizational hierarchy, legislation, etc.) were aligned with public networks and 
activists, the public political basis of power motivated the state network.  Reflecting on this, we 
are able to see that the power dynamics of both domination and resistance to domination are 
based in the formations of human networks and networking strategies that may create or 
reprogram existing networks (whether governmental, private, or public).  This leads us to 
acknowledge both economic and political sources of power as fundamentally rooted in the 
context of the social landscape, so that sources of power are rarely hegemonic, and operate 
through social networks and through the interactions of these networks.    
 From this conception of socially-based network power, we may tie together socio-
political activity and socio-environmental activity.  That is, we can understand social networks 
(state, private and civil society) as the underlying regulators of resource flows, in aggregate, 
directing resources parallel to human systems and socially-based economic networks.  In this 
way, an environmentally focused sociology of flows is able to accurately portray environmental 
resource flows as inseparable from their associated social processes and human networks.  This 
is not to ignore larger climatological or geological trends, but only to focus on anthropogenic 
environmental flows use and changes; which I assert as the most important problematic of our 
time in our known universe.  By demystifying environmental flows (non-human natural 
processes aside) as connected to social networks, we are able to consider what power public civil 
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society actors do have.  Encouragingly, one important aspect of this power is the ability to affect 
state governance through forming networks of resistance, which if aligned, may assert publicly-
interested goals through the political power of the state and its management of public and 
environmentally delicate resources.  This in many cases will mean resisting the privately-
interested goals supported by economic power and proffered to the state and its public as a 
common interest.  Though this policy dispute has yet to reach a conclusion, either in water rights 
policy or changing flows of resource allocation, what is encouraging is that the significant 
resistance efforts of civil society networks, despite the alignable goals of the private and state 
networks, has yet to allow the bottling plant near Oxbow Springs to be built, and for now, that is 
where the water has stayed.
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